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Abstract
We investigate the optimal tax and privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly in which a state-
owned public firm competes against private firms in a free-entry market. First, we investigate the
domestic private firm case. The optimal tax rate is strictly positive except for the full privatization
and full nationalization cases, and the relationship between the optimal tax rate and degree of
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1 Introduction
Tax-subsidy policies are widely observed as industry policies in many industries (Itoh et. al., 1991). In
particular, these policies prevail in typical mixed oligopolies such as the banking, energy, automobile,
telecommunications, and transportation industries, and are intensively discussed in the literature
(Mujumdar and Pal, 1998). If the government can choose the tax or subsidy rate without incurring
any political cost, this is an effective and efficient policy instrument in such industries. Indeed, White
(1996) investigated a mixed oligopoly in which a state-owned public firm competes against private
firms. He showed that the first-best outcome is achieved both before and after the privatization of the
public firm by adopting the same optimal tax-subsidy policy as long as the public firm is as efficient as
the private firms. His result implies that privatization does not matter (i.e. the privatization neutrality
theorem), and thus, there is no room for discussing how privatization affects the optimal tax-subsidy
policy.
Cato and Matsumura (2013), however, showed that the privatization neutrality theorem does not
hold in free-entry markets, and thus it is worth discussing how privatization affects the optimal tax-
subsidy policy in these markets. Indeed, the literature on mixed oligopolies has intensively investigated
free-entry markets.1 The reason for this is associated with recent deregulation and liberalization, which
have weakened entry restrictions in mixed oligopolies significantly. As a result, private enterprises have
newly entered such mixed oligopolies as the above-mentioned banking, energy, telecommunications,
and transportation industries.
Based on the foregoing, this study analyses (i) how tax-subsidy policy affects the optimal privati-
zation policy and (ii) how the optimal privatization policy affects tax-subsidy policy. In other words,
1By using a monopolistic competition framework, Anderson et al. (1997) showed that privatization may improve
welfare when private competitors are domestic, and Matsumura et al. (2009) showed that privatization is more likely to
improve welfare when private enterprises are foreign. Matsumura and Kanda (2005) adopted the partial privatization
approach formulated by Matsumura (1998) and showed that the optimal degree of privatization is zero when private
competitors are domestic, while Cato and Matsumura (2012) showed that it is strictly positive when they are foreign
and that this is increasing in the foreign ownership share in private firms. Chen (2017) revisited this problem by
introducing the cost-reducing effect of privatization. Fujiwara (2007) discussed the relationship between the degree of
product differentiation and optimal degree of privatization. Cato and Matsumura (2015) discussed the relationship
between optimal trade and privatization policies.
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we investigate the relationship between privatization policy and industrial policy. First, we investi-
gate how the degree of privatization affects the optimal tax-subsidy policy in a free-entry market with
domestic private firms. We find that the optimal tax rate is zero before and after the full privatization
of the public firm. Then, we naturally expect that the optimal tax rate is zero regardless of the degree
of privatization. However, we show that the relationship between the optimal tax rate and degree of
privatization is inverted U-shaped, which implies that the optimal tax rate is strictly positive except
for the two polar cases (i.e. the full privatization and full nationalization cases). This finding reveals
the possible risk of restricting the analysis to these two polar cases.
Two underlying assumptions are crucial here. First, we adopt the partial privatization approach
of Matsumura (1998) in our model (i.e. there exists a degree of privatization). As discussed above,
the optimal tax rate is then zero both for full privatization and for full nationalization. Therefore,
the optimal tax rate seems to be independent of privatization policy if we do not allow partial priva-
tization and instead focus on the two polar cases. Thus, introducing partial privatization is crucial.
Second, we assume that the degree of privatization is given exogenously for some political reason. This
assumption might correspond to the situation in which the adjustment of privatization is slow, while
the government can choose any tax rate flexibly. If the government can choose both the tax-subsidy
rate and the degree of privatization without incurring any political costs, the optimal tax rate is again
zero to minimize the tax distortion. Therefore, this assumption, which is natural in the presence of
lobbying or influencing activities for privatization policies, is also crucial .
Next, we investigate how industrial policy affects the optimal privatization policy in a free-entry
market with domestic private firms. This situation corresponds to the case where barriers to choosing
the optimal tax rate exist. Industrial policy might not be optimal and might be given exogenously
because of the lobbying activities of firms and industrial associations for tax policies or the govern-
ment’s budget constraint and fiscal concerns. We find that the optimal privatization rate is increasing
in the tax rate. Thus, stronger industrial policy leads to stronger privatization policy.
Our observations indicate that the two policies are mutually dependent. If the government has a
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department for industrial policy and a department for privatization policy, it is important to create an
interaction between them, even if a cost of doing so exists or the other department cannot choose the
optimal policy. However, our interdependency result depends on the assumption that the private firms
are domestic. We find that when the private firms are foreign, the two policies are independent. That
is, the optimal tax rate is not dependent on the degree of privatization and the degree of privatization
is not dependent on the tax rate. This finding suggests that a change in economic environment (such
as ownership structure in private firms) that affects the strategic relationship between firms can affect
their basic principles of optimal policies.2 Thus, policy-makers should take account of such a change
in the economic environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our basic model with domestic
private firms. Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 extends our model to the case with
foreign private firms. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Model
Firms produce homogeneous goods and engage in Cournot competition. The inverse demand function
is assumed to be f(X) = A −X (A is a positive real number and X is total output). Here, market
demand A is assumed to be sufficiently large. We consider N + 1 firms. Firm 0 is a partially state-
owned public firm, while the other firms i (i = 1, 2, ..., N) are private. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be the degree of
privatization of firm 0.
All firms have the same cost function g(xi) = cx
2
i /2 +K, where xi ≥ 0 is firm i′s output level, c
and K are positive real numbers, and K is the entry cost of each private firm. The government levies
a simple unit production tax τ (if τ is negative, the tax becomes a production subsidy). Each firm i’s
profit is given by
Πi = f(X)xi − g(xi)− τxi (i = 0, 1, . . . , N),
2If there is no public firm, the presence of foreign firms does not affect the strategic relationship between them. The
public firm cares about welfare, which includes the producer surplus of domestic firms. Thus, the presence of foreign
firms changes the objective of the public firm. In other words, the strategic relationship changes by introducing foreign
firms.
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where X =
∑N
i=1 xi. Tax revenue R is R = τX.
Economic welfare E consists of the sum of the consumer surplus, firms’ profits, and tax revenue
as follows :
E =
∫ X
0
f(x)dx− f(X)X +
N∑
i=0
Πi +R
=
∫ X
0
f(x)dx−
N∑
i=0
(g(xi) +K). (1)
Each private firm maximizes its profit. Firm 0’s objective is the weighted average of Π0 and E:
αΠ0 + (1− α)E.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses production tax
τ (Model 1) or the degree α of privatization (Model 2) to maximize E. In the second stage, private
firms enter after observing the government’s decision. Given the number of entering private firms, all
firms engage in Cournot competition.
3 Results
3.1 Second- and third-stage subgames
First, we present the common analysis in Models 1 and 2. In the third stage, given N , α, and τ , each
firm chooses its output independently. Firm 0’s first-order condition is given by
f(X) + αf ′(X)x0 − g′(x0)− ατ = 0,
where X =
∑N
i=0 xi. The private firm’s first-order condition is given by
f(X) + f ′(X)xi − g′(xi)− τ = 0.
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium at which all private firms produce the same output (x1 = x2 =
· · · = xN ).
5
In the second stage, given α and τ , private firms enter the market when their profits are nonneg-
ative. Hence, the zero-profit condition holds:
f(X)x1 − g(x1)− τx1 = 0.
By solving the above equilibrium conditions (in the second and third stages), the following equi-
librium outcomes are derived:
x∗0(τ, α) =
1 + c
α+ c
√
2K
2 + c
+
1− α
α+ c
τ, (2)
x∗1(τ, α) =
√
2K
2 + c
, (3)
X∗(τ, α) = A− τ − (1 + c)
√
2K
2 + c
, (4)
N∗(τ, α) =
X∗(τ, α)− x∗0(τ, α)
x∗1(τ, α)
. (5)
Since A is sufficiently large, X∗ is positive. We here use superscript ∗ to denote the equilibrium values.
From (2)–(5), we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. (i) ∂x∗0/∂α < 0. (ii) ∂x∗0/∂τ ≥ 0 and the equality holds only if α = 1. (iii) ∂x∗0/∂τ is
decreasing in α. (iv) ∂x∗1/∂α = ∂x∗1/∂τ = 0. (v) ∂N∗/∂α > 0, ∂N∗/∂τ < 0.
Cato and Matsumura (2012) showed that x∗0 is decreasing in α, N∗ is decreasing in α, and x∗1 is
independent of α, when τ = 0. The same principle can apply to the case with nonzero τ .
An increase in τ increases the marginal cost of each private firm and reduces the production of each
private firm (the cost effect); at the same time, an increase in τ raises the equilibrium price, which
stimulates the production of each private firm (the price effect). These two effects are cancelled out,
and thus x∗1 does not depend on τ . However, a higher price caused by a higher tax rate reduces total
output, and thus reduces the number of entering firms. For the welfare-maximizing public firm, the
tax is not its real cost (because the tax is an income transfer from the public firm to the government),
and thus the cost effect is weaker unless α = 1. Therefore, the cost effect is dominated by the price
effect, and thus x0 is increasing in τ (Lemma 1(ii)). However, the difference of the cost effect between
6
firm 0 and each private firm is smaller when α is larger, and thus the output expansion effect of firm
0 by the tax weakens when α is larger (Lemma 1(iii)).
Equilibrium welfare E∗(τ, α) is given as follows:
E∗(τ, α) =
∫ X∗(τ,α)
0
f(x)dx− [g(x∗0(τ, α)) +K]−N∗(τ, α)[g(x∗0(τ, α)) +K].
3.2 Model 1 (endogenous τ)
We consider the optimal tax policy. In the first stage, the government maximizes E∗ with respect to
τ . Define τB as follows:
τB(α) := argmax
τ
E∗(τ, α).
By solving this problem, we obtain the optimal production tax:
τB =
√
2K
2 + c
(1− α)α
α2 + c
.
Note that the optimal tax rate is zero under full privatization and full nationalization. These two
extreme cases are proved by Cato and Matsumura (2013). One might guess that it is zero for any degree
of partial privatization because partial privatization is a combination of full privatization and full
nationalization. However, it is strictly positive in between these extremes. We present a nonmonotonic
property between the optimal tax rate and degree of privatization.
Proposition 1. τB(α) is increasing in α for α < αˆ and decreasing in τ for α > αˆ, where
αˆ =
√
c2 + c− c.
Proof. By differentiating τB with respect to α, we get the following:
dτB
dα
=
√
2K
2 + c
c− 2cα− α2
(α2 + c)2
.
dτB/dα is positive when α < αˆ and negative when α > αˆ. ■
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Note that 0 <
√
c2 + c − c < 1 for any c. Therefore, the inverse U-shape is a robust observation
with respect to c.
We explain the intuition behind Proposition 1. Because the producer surplus of the private firms is
zero, welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus, tax revenue, and public firm’s profit. The tax-subsidy
distorts consumption and production, and thus the optimal tax rate is zero if x0 is given exogenously.
As Matsumura and Kanda (2005) showed, α = 0 yields the optimal x0 given τ = 0. Under these
conditions, τ = 0 is optimal when α = 0. However, a marginal increase in α reduces x0 (Lemma
1(i)), which reduces the resulting profit of firm 0. An increase in τ stimulates the production of firm
0, thus increasing firm 0’s profit and improving welfare. Therefore, the optimal tax rate becomes
positive. Moreover, an increase in α makes firm 0 less aggressive, and thus the government adjusts τ
to stimulate firm 0’s production further. However, when α reaches a critical point, the loss of the tax
distortion caused by the higher tax rate dominates the welfare gain of the further production of firm
0. Note that ∂x∗0/∂τ is decreasing in α. After that, a further increase in α reduces the optimal tax
rate because a higher tax rate is less likely to stimulate the production of firm 0. When α = 1, the
production expansion effect of firm 0 caused by the higher tax rate disappears and the optimal tax
rate becomes zero to minimize the tax distortion.
We now consider the welfare implications. Each component of economic welfare under the optimal
tax rate is defined as follows:
CSB(α) = (X∗(τB(α), α))2/2;
PSB(α) = (A−X∗(τB(α), α)− tauB(α))x∗0(τB(α), α)− c(x∗0(τB(α), α))2/2;
RB(α) = τB(α)X∗(τB(α), α).
Let EB = CSB + PSB +RB.
First, we consider the change in the consumer surplus. By differentiating CSB with respect to α,
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we obtain the following:
dCSB
dα
= −
(c− 2cα− α2)
[
A(α2 + c)− (α+ c+ α2c+ c2)
√
2K
2+c
]
(α2 + c)3
√
2K
2 + c
.
Since A is sufficiently large, the sign of this is dependent only on (c − 2cα − α2). This implies that
we observe a U-shape. That is, CSB is decreasing in α for α < αˆ, while CSB is increasing in α for
α > αˆ. This result is intuitive. The consumer surplus is increasing in total output, which is decreasing
in the tax level. Thus, the consumer surplus is negatively associated with the tax. Since the tax is an
inverted U-shape with respect to α, the consumer surplus is U-shaped.
Second, we consider the change in the producer surplus. By differentiating CSB with respect to
α, we obtain the following:
dPSB
dα
= −2Kα(α+ c)(c+ 2α− α
2)
(2 + c)(α2 + c)3
.
Since (c+ 2α− α2) is always positive for α ∈ [0, 1], PSB is always decreasing in α.
Third, we consider the change in tax revenue:
dRB
dα
=
(c− 2cα− α2)
[
A(α2 + c)− (2α+ α2(c− 1) + c(c+ 1))
√
2K
2+c
]
(α2 + c)3
√
2K
2 + c
.
The inverted U-shape holds for RB. That is, RB is increasing in α for α < αˆ, while RB is decreasing
in α for α > αˆ. Therefore, the nonmonotonic relationship holds for the consumer surplus and tax
revenue.
Finally, we consider the total effect of partial privatization on economic welfare:
dEB
dα
=
dCSB
dα
+
dPSB
dα
+
dRB
dα
= − 2Kα(1 + c)
(2 + c)(α2 + c)2
.
Thus, EB is decreasing in α if α > 0 (and dEB/dα = 0 if α = 0). Therefore, we get a downward
sloping curve for total welfare.
3.3 Model 2 (endogenous α)
Next, we consider the optimal degree of privatization, which is defined as αB:
αB(τ) := argmax
α
Eˆ(τ, α).
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By solving this problem, we have the optimal degree of privatization:
αB(τ) =
tc(2 + c)(
√
2K + t
√
2 + c)
2(1 + c)K
√
2 + c+ t(2 + 5c+ 2c2)
√
2K + t2c(2 + c)
√
2 + c
. (6)
Proposition 2. αB(τ) is increasing in τ . Moreover, αB(0) = 0 and αB(τ) < 1 for all τ .
Proof. By differentiating αB with respect to τ , we get the following:
dαB
dτ
=
c(c2 + 3c+ 2)[2K
√
(2K)(2 + c) + 4t(2 + c)K + t2(2 + c)
√
(2K)(2 + c)]
[2(1 + c)K
√
2 + c+ t(2 + 5c+ 2c2)
√
2K + t2c(2 + c)
√
2 + c]2
.
From (6), it follows that αB(0) = 0. Moreover, αB(τ) < 1 because
tc(2 + c)(
√
2K + t
√
2 + c) < 2(1 + c)K
√
2 + c+ t(2 + 5c+ 2c2)
√
2K + t2c(2 + c)
√
2 + c. ■
We now provide a brief analysis of welfare. Total output is not dependent on α, and thus we find
that CSB(τ) is decreasing in τ . When c = 1 (the general case is complicated),
dEB(τ)
dτ
= −τ < 0 for τ > 0.
For most parameters, we can see that PSB(τ) is decreasing in τ and RB(τ) is increasing in τ . The
positive effect on tax revenue is not large, and thus it is dominated by the negative effects on the
consumer surplus and producer surplus.
Finally, let us consider the case where the government adjusts both tax and privatization levels.
The optimal degree of privatization and tax rate in such an ideal situation is as follows:
αBB = 0 and τBB = 0.
That is, a combination of full nationalization and no production tax maximizes economic welfare.
Nonzero tax distorts the consumption/production decision and reduces welfare given the output of
firm 0. As Lee et al. (2017) showed, the marginal cost pricing of firm 0 is optimal for welfare when
τ = 0. In the case of domestic private firms, α = 0 equalizes the public firm’s marginal cost to the
price and this is best for welfare. These lead to the above result.
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4 Foreign Firms
In the previous section, we showed that tax-subsidy and privatization policies are interdependent. In
this section, we show that this result does not hold if the private firms are owned by foreign investors.3
We assume the private firms to be foreign-owned. In this case, the profit of each private firm is
not counted in the economic welfare of the home country. Thus, economic welfare is as follows:
E =
∫ X
0
f(z)dz − f(X)X +Π0 + τ
n∑
i=0
xi. (7)
The objective of firm 0 is
αΠ0 + (1− α)E = Π0 + (1− α)[
∫ X
0
f(z)dz − f(X)X + τ
n∑
i=0
xi].
Since the objective of firm 0 is αΠ0 + (1− α)E, the first-order condition of firm 0 is as follows:
f(X)− (1− α)f ′(X)X + f ′(X)x0 − g′(xi)− ατ = 0.
We assume that the government sells the ownership of firm 0 to domestic investors. The other two
conditions are the same as before (the first-order condition of private firms and zero-profit condition).
By solving the above equilibrium conditions (in the second and third stages), the equilibrium
outcomes are derived:
x∗0(τ, α) =
1− α
1 + c
A+ α
√
2K
2 + c
, (8)
x∗1(τ, α) =
√
2K
2 + c
, (9)
X∗(τ, α) = A− τ − (1 + c)
√
2K
2 + c
, (10)
N∗(τ, α) =
X∗(τ, α)− x∗0(τ, α)
x∗1(τ, α)
. (11)
From (8)–(11), we obtain the following result.
3Whether the private firm is domestic or foreign often yields contrasting results in the literature on mixed oligopolies.
See Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005a, 2005b),
Heywood and Ye (2009), and Lin and Matsumura (2012).
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Lemma 2. (i) ∂x∗0/∂α < 0. (ii) ∂x∗0/∂τ = 0. (iii) ∂x∗1/∂α = ∂x∗1/∂τ = 0. (iv) ∂N∗/∂α > 0,
∂N∗/∂τ < 0.
Lemma 2 is the same as Lemma 1 except for Lemma 2(ii). Lemma 1(ii) states that firm 0’s output
is increasing in τ when private firms are domestic, and Lemma 2(ii) states that this is independent of
τ when private firms are foreign. We explain the intuition behind this result. Suppose that private
firms are domestic. An increase in τ reduces the total output of private firms and thus raises the price
if x0 remains unchanged. Because the social marginal cost of firm 0 does not depend on τ given x0, an
increase in τ increases the price–(social) cost margin in firm 0, which increases x0 (the margin effect).
However, if private firms are foreign, an additional effect exists. An increase in x0 reduces the
price and thus reduces the outflow of the surplus to foreign investors. This effect is weaker when the
total output of private firms is smaller (the outflow-restricting effect). An increase in τ reduces the
total output of private firms, which strengthens the margin effect and weakens the outflow-restricting
effect. These two effects are cancelled out, and thus τ does not affect x∗0.
We then derive the optimal tax rate and optimal degree of privatization by adopting the same
procedure as in the previous section.
Proposition 3.
τB(α) = 0 and αB(τ) =
Ac(2 + c)− (1 + c)2√2(2 + c)K
Ac(2 + c)− c(1 + c)√2(2 + c)K ∈ (0, 1).
The optimal tax rate is always zero independent of the degree of privatization. The degree of
privatization is positive at some value between zero and one, and it is independent of the tax rate.
These results suggest that the two policies are independent.
The main point of this result is that we do not observe a nonmonotonic relationship between the
optimal tax rate and degree of privatization. That is, when private firms are domestic, the optimal
tax rate increases until a certain degree of privatization and then decreases. The U-shape disappears
when private firm are foreign. The driving force of this result is Lemma 2(ii). In contrast to the
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domestic private firm case, the tax rate does not affect the behaviour of the public firm. Therefore,
the government chooses τ = 0 to minimize the tax distortion. As discussed in the previous section,
the marginal cost pricing of the public firm is best for welfare. Because the tax rate does not affect
the behaviour of the public firm (only α does), the optimal α that induces the marginal cost pricing
of firm 0 is independent of τ .
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate the relationship between privatization and industrial policy. We find
that regardless of whether private firms are domestic and foreign, the optimal tax rate is zero in
both the full nationalization and the full privatization cases. However, the optimal tax rate is strictly
positive except for these two cases if private firms are domestic. Our result suggests the possible risk of
restricting the analysis to these two polar cases and highlights the importance of partial privatization.
A comparison with the case with foreign firms shows that our interdependency result is dependent
on the ownership of private firms. Since the recent trend of entry deregulation not only enhances the
entry of domestic firms but also allows foreign firms to penetrate markets, it is natural to consider the
presence of foreign firms. However, this study focuses on the two extreme cases: (i) the case where all
private firms are domestic and (ii) the case where all private firms are foreign. We can consider the
intermediate case: foreign inventers own some share θ(∈ [0, 1]) of private firms and domestic welfare
includes (1−θ)(profits of private firms). In this case, we show that the main implications are between
these two extreme cases (i.e. when θ = 0 and θ = 1). Moreover, the interdependency of the two
policies weakens as θ increases.
In this study, we assume that the policies are implemented before the entry of private firms.
However, as Lee et al. (2017) showed, the timing of such policies may affect policymaking in mixed
oligopolies. Investigating this topic is left to future research.
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